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Abstract: Recent work by emotion researchers indicates that emotions have a multi-
level structure. Sophisticated sentimentalists should take note of this work—for it 
better enables them to defend a substantive role for emotion in moral cognition. 
Contra May’s rationalist criticisms, emotions are not only able to carry morally relevant 
information but can also substantially influence moral judgment and reasoning. 
 
Not every form of sentimentalism is plausible and Josh May’s book shows that there’s reason to 
doubt some recent, prominent formulations. But it doesn’t follow from this that we should be 
rationalists. Rather, I believe that May’s criticisms help us see what a better sentimentalist meta-ethic 
should look like. More specifically, investigating what a sentimentalist should say about the nature of 
emotion reveals that emotions play a more significant role in moral cognition than May presumes. A 
sophisticated sentimentalism thus remains an important rival to rationalism. 
Emotions for Sentimentalists 
As May sees it, sentimentalists face a dilemma. If emotions are just non-cognitive feelings, then they 
play no substantive role in moral cognition. By contrast, if emotions are partly cognitive (i.e., belief-
like states), then the substantive work that they do in moral thought is best explained by their 
cognitive—not sentimentalist—features (51-2).  
In response, sentimentalists should reject the picture of emotion that May’s dilemma 
presupposes. At a gloss, emotions are intentional mental states with evaluative content. To be angry 
about a comment is to see that comment as an affront—as something that calls for a response; to 
feel compassion toward another is to see her as suffering—as someone to be helped. Pushing 
deeper, sentimentalists should follow emotion researchers in seeing emotions as states that involve 
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multi-level content and processing (e.g., Griffiths 2004; Izard 2007; Kurth 2018: chap. 2; Levenson 
et al. 2007).  
At a low-level, emotions have course-grained, non-conceptual evaluative content that is 
intimately tied to feeling and action. So, for instance, to feel angry is to experience the actions of 
another as challenge-to-standing-bad; feelings of shame convey something like social-rank-asymmetry-bad; 
compassion presents its target as another-suffering-bad. Here the hyphenated strings are gestures toward 
the distinctive, motivationally-laden evaluative dimensions of these emotions’ low-level, non-
conceptual content.  
At the high-level, an emotion’s distinctive evaluative content is both fine-grained and 
conceptual in a manner that facilitates their use in reasoning. So, for instance, anger toward a 
comment presents that comment as, roughly, an affront to one’s (moral) standing. With shame, one 
sees oneself as having failed to live up to an ego-ideal. In both cases, the high-level conceptual 
content facilitates inferences about (respectively) being wronged and one’s social-moral inferiority. 
Importantly, a single emotional experience (e.g., a token of anger) will typically engage both 
types of content and both levels of processing (Griffiths 2004; Kurth 2018; Wringe 2015). Moreover, 
while the two channels of emotion content/processing generally preform complementary—though 
distinct—functions, they can come apart in ways that lend support to the above picture. 
Consider, for instance, experimental work on “repressors.” When these individuals are 
presented with a threatening stimuli, they display the attentional and physiological changes 
associated with fear—but they deny being afraid. What we appear to have, then, is a dissociation of 
low- and high-level emotion processing: while the low-level processing of repressors generates the 
action-oriented attentional shifts and physiological responses characteristic of fear, their high-level 
processing fails to categorize the situation under the relevant concept (FEARSOME or DANGER). 
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Hence they deny feeling the fear that they otherwise seem to be experiencing (Derakshan et al. 2007; 
Kurth 2018: 58-9). 
Notice as well that emotions aren’t unique in being mental states with multi-level 
content/processing of this sort. Work in vision science, for instance, indicates that the content of 
visual perception is the upshot of two distinct channels: one (the ventral) that’s involved in the 
perception of action and another (the dorsal) that’s tied to memory and speech-processing. As with 
emotions, while visual perception typically combines these two sources of content as part of a 
unified visual experience, the two channels can be forced apart (Aglioti et al. 1995; Wringe 2015).  
In the present context, recognizing the multi-level structure of emotion is important because 
it opens up space for a distinctly sentimentalist thesis about the content and function of emotions. 
More specifically, with the above account in hand, sentimentalists can maintain that the low-level, 
motivationally-laden evaluative content of an emotion grounds the evaluative concept(s) distinctive of 
that emotion’s high-level content. So, for instance, shame’s low-level content (i.e., social-rank-
asymmetry-bad) fundamentally shapes and constrains both one’s concept SHAMEFUL and shame’s 
associated high-level content (roughly, the evaluation that I’ve failed to live up to an ego-ideal). 
Similarly, compassion’s low-level content (namely, another-suffering-bad) fundamentally shapes and 
constrains one’s concept COMPASSION-WORTHY and compassion’s associated high-level content 
(roughly, the evaluation that the target of one’s compassion is enduring a serious and underserved 
misfortune that merits one’s attention). 
Crucially, the dependencies here are fundamental in a distinctly sentimentalist sense: our 
understanding of the high-level evaluative concepts that are associated with emotions like shame and 
compassion comes by way of the motivationally-laden, non-conceptual content carried by theses 
emotions’ low-level evaluations (D’Arms 2005; Izard 2007; Kauppinen 2013). We find empirical 
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support for this sentimentalist thesis in work on the evolutionary origins and development of 
emotion. For instance, research in anthropology, psychology, and cognitive science provides 
evidence of high-level emotion content being shaped and constrained by low-level content for a 
range of emotions including shame (Fessler 1999), fear and anxiety (Öhman 2008; Kurth 2016, 
2018), and disgust (Tyber et. al 2013).  
Moreover, the idea that low-level, non-conceptual content can ground high-level content 
isn’t unique to emotion. Consider color. The “unity relations” (that is, the phenomena of, e.g., reds 
looking more similar to oranges than greens) are thought to be non-conceptual features of color 
experience that shape and constrain both our color concepts and high-level, color content (e.g., RED 
and GREEN pick out “opposites” but RED and ORANGE do not) (Cohen 2003; Johnston 1992).  
The Pay Off: A Sophisticated Sentimentalism 
If emotions are states of the sort sketched above, then—contra May—sentimentalism can explain 
how emotions are able to both “carry morally relevant information” and “substantially influence 
moral judgment” (52). 
Taking these in turn, first notice that emotions are concerned with fundamental human 
values: compassion concerns the suffering of others, shame concerns the loss of social status, anger 
concerns challenges to one’s standing. But notice as well that the protection and promotion of these 
values is at the core of what we take morality to be. If that’s right, then the above sentimentalist 
account of the content of emotions entails that they carry morally relevant information.  
May might object that this connection between emotion and morality is too indirect—while 
emotions might highlight morally relevant information, they’re not essential for making moral 
judgments (13-14). However, if the sentimentalist is correct that emotions are essential to our 
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understanding of evaluative content—grounding, e.g., the distinctive badness of SHAMEFUL, the 
special neediness of COMPASSION-WORTHY—then May’s objection is misplaced. Acquiring 
evaluative concepts is not something a “sophisticated robot” could do (14). At best, a robot could 
approximate emotion’s distinctive evaluative content by drawing on information provided by actual 
emoters (c.f., Kauppinen 2013).  
Turn then to the question of emotions’ influence on moral judgment. The above account of 
emotions and their connection to moral/evaluative content, entails that emotions contribute to 
moral inferences insofar as they are essential sources of morally relevant content. Here too May is 
likely to protest that an influence of this sort is too thin to vindicate sentimentalism—though 
emotions “facilitate information processing,” they aren’t essential to moral inference in a deeper way 
(13, 71). But again notice that on the above sentimentalist account, the low-level content of 
emotions is foundational for our understanding of the associated, high-level evaluative concepts that 
we use when making moral inferences. So, contra rationalists like May, moral inferences are 
“ultimately dependent on non-rational emotions” (7).  
Yet one might still worry that even if emotions are fundamental in this sense, the role that 
they play is still too paltry—after all, their distinctly sentimentalist-friendly low-level content only 
plays an indirect role in moral inference. In light of this, it’s important to recognize that emotions’ 
low-level content also has a direct impact on moral decision making and inference.  
For instance, the low-level content of emotion can block the inferences and conclusions that 
one is brought to via explicit reasoning. Huck Finn’s deliberations told him he ought to turn Jim 
over to the slave hunters. But the compassion he felt for his friend interfered, preventing him from 
endorsing the conclusion of his reasoning (Tappolet 2016: 180). Additionally, emotion’s low-level 
content can also lead us to question the moral judgments we’ve made: Martin Luther King, Jr., for 
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example, spoke of the anxiety he felt about his conclusion that it would be wrong to protest the 
Vietnam War—in particular, he saw his anxiety as central to his realization that his decision not to 
protest was mistaken (Kurth 2018: chap. 6).  
In both of these cases, the low-level content of emotion not only provides morally relevant 
information that was not captured via deliberation, but also directly influences these individuals’ 
subsequent decisions and actions.  
Most significantly, emotions can be immediate, non-inferential drivers of basic moral beliefs 
and judgments. To draw this out, first notice that May allows that we can come to have beliefs 
without engaging in any (explicit or implicit) reasoning. He thinks this happens when, for instance, 
you immediately (i.e., non-inferentially) come to the conclusion that the door opening before you 
retains its rectangular shape: such a judgment is not the result of reasoning, but rather the upshot of 
you “simply taking your visual experience at face value” (9). 
But now notice that moral judgments can be formed via emotions through the same kind of 
immediate, non-inferential process: I immediately come to believe that I’ve been insulted from the 
anger that I feel at your comment; your judgment that the invalid needs help springs immediately 
from the compassion you feel on seeing her crumpled on the sidewalk. Basic moral beliefs like these 
needn’t be the upshot of (implicit) reasoning. Rather—just like May’s door example—they can result 
from simply taking your emotional experience at face value. Moreover, while this point has been 
made by sentimentalists who take emotions to be perceptions (e.g., Tappolet 2016), the above 
account of emotion indicates that it holds for sentimentalism more generally. 
In short, we have a range of examples showing not only that emotions carry morally relevant 
information, but also that they can play a significant role in moral judgment and inference.  
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Emotions are not mere consequences 
At this point May might object that the sentimentalism sketched here fits poorly with empirical 
findings suggesting that emotions are merely a consequence of (non-emotion-based) moral 
inferences and beliefs, not the drivers of them (38-41). In particular, May could extend the 
conclusions that he draws from experiments investigating the temporal order of subjects’ judgments 
about the disgustingness and moral wrongness of certain actions (Yang et al. 2013). This work 
suggests that disgust judgments follow moral judgments—a conclusion that fits poorly with standard 
sentimentalist proposals.  
However, the relevance of these experiments is questionable. First, it’s unclear how much we 
can draw from experiments focused on just one emotion (disgust). Moreover, research on other 
emotions (fear and anxiety) suggests that the temporal ordering of emotion and higher cognition is 
more in line with the sentimentalist account sketched here (e.g., Hofmann et al. 2012, Kurth 2018: 
52-3). Most significantly, the task used in Yang et al.’s Go/No-Go experiments was complex: 
subjects were asked to make a decision about what button to push based on comparisons of their 
assessments of the disgustingness and moral wrongness of an action. But given that this was the 
task, the experiment does not appear to provide insight of the sort May needs (namely, evidence 
about the temporal order of feelings of disgust in comparison to moral judgments). Rather, it appears to 
focus on something else: how we make comparative assessments about (i) our judgments regarding the 
disgustingness of an action and (ii) our judgments of the moral wrongness of that action. 
Stepping back, we can see how a richer understanding of what emotions are provides 
sentimentalists with new resources that help them vindicate a central role for emotion in moral 
cognition.  
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